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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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15 November 1985

WORLDWIDE REPORT

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

U.S. INTERPRETATION OF ABM TREATY HIT

TV Report

LD242153 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2035 GMT 24 Oct 85

[From "The World Today" program presented by Eduard Nmatsakanov; announcer-read report]

[Text] In his recent speeches, Weinberger, the U.S. defense secretary, his assistant Perle, and other high-ranking representatives of the U.S. military have begun over-stretching in their efforts to present matters as though the Soviet-U.S. treaty virtually sanctions research and even the testing and development [razrabotka] of space weapons.

But this is absurd; such attempts are merely giving rise to growing alarm among many U.S. politicians. It has been reported from Washington that six leading U.S. politicians, who have at various times held the office of the U.S. secretary of defense -- Brown, Clifford, McNamara, and others -- have urged Reagan not to take any steps that might lead to an erosion of the Soviet-U.S. treaty. However, their recommendations have been rejected by the White House.

Washington 'Undermining' Treaty

LD291827 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1520 GMT 29 Oct 85

["An Attempt at Undermining the ABM Treaty"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, October 29 TASS -- Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS military news analyst, writes:

Casper Weinberger, U.S. defense secretary, has arrived in Brussels to continue his attempts at drawing the NATO countries into the "star wars" program and solicit "support" for the far-fetched U.S. charges against the USSR of an alleged violation of the arms control agreement. Yes, as the West European press says, the Pentagon chief will have to encounter something quite different -- a totally different situation -- strong discontent among the allies over Washington's attitude to the Soviet-U.S. ABM treaty, which is without a time limit. It is precisely Weinberger's department which is the main mastermind of "new interpretations" of that highly important document. "Interpretations," which, as the British newspaper DAILY TELEGRAPH admitted, touched off a storm of indignation in the NATO countries.

It is apt to recall that they in Washington loudly declared for everybody to hear on 6 October a "broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty," according to which the development and testing of systems and components under the "star wars" program far from being prohibited are almost sanctioned by the treaty. Moreover, they call in question even the prohibition of the deployment of weapons under that program. If one is to believe them, the limitation was only one -- that the ABM systems and components be based on physical principles other than counter-missiles.

This "discovery" has been made public by Robert McFarlane, assistant to the President for national security affairs, and prepared at the Pentagon.

Legal adviser F. Kansberg, who has no experience in the field of limitation and reduction of weapons, has presented "conclusions" completely changing the juridical stand of four U.S. presidents, including President Reagan. They amazed even such an experienced "hawk" as Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense. The latter, as the newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST said, was extremely happy about the "invention", because he no longer had to rack his brains over how he could fulfill the "instructions" of the Pentagon chief who demanded that possibilities be examined for an effective cancellation of the ABM treaty.

Yet the world public by no means shares the views of McFarlane, Weinberger, and Perle. Even in the United States this "broad interpretation" of the treaty has been described as "outright fraud" and an "irresponsible step". The opinion of Washington's West European allies has been expressed by the British THE TIMES, which said public departure from the rigid framework determined by the treaty as regards the testing and deployment of new weapons, especially of outer space weapons, will have catastrophic consequences. Such a step would trigger angry protests in Western Europe, split public opinion in the United States, and possibly, torpedo the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. "Serious objections", "concern and dissatisfaction" have been expressed even by the Governments of Britain and the FRG, which so zealously support the "star wars" programs.

The U.S. Administration began maneuvering, another "interpretation" of the treaty -- a "restricted" one -- has emerged. U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz said the United States would implement its program according to this "restrictive interpretation". But what is its meaning? As Larry Speakes, deputy White House press secretary explained, the United States will be committed to the current interpretation given by the President: This is just what he has specified more than once, research and testing. His colleague D. Djerejian added that SDI is a program which, as the President said, includes research, testing, and development.

This is the real price of the "restrictive interpretation."

But where is the "restraint," about which the U.S. representatives speak, if they explain that both research and testing will be carried out during the implementation of the program? Since the ABM Treaty (Article 5) prohibits not only the deployment, but the development and testing of sea, air, outer space or mobile land-based ABM systems or components?

All this means only one thing, the U.S. Administration further intends to violate the ABM Treaty, using as a cover its own "interpretation" of its provisions, which is "convenient" for official Washington. Both of these two "new" interpretations of the treaty -- the "broad" and "restrictive" one -- are in actual fact neither restrictive nor comply with the provisions of the treaty.

Moreover, the U.S. leaders far from dissociating themselves from the "broad" interpretation, have completely solidarized with it. They in Washington officially declared that the President believes a broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty is an appropriate one, yet the administration, acting on his instructions, consented to stick to the restrictive interpretation of the treaty.

Hence, two alarming conclusions signaling danger to the ABM Treaty. First, the limitations under the treaty are viewed by Washington not as a national commitment, but as a "decision of the U.S. President". So far, its "restrictive interpretation" (albeit it is already in conflict with the provisions of the treaty) is "satisfactory" for the United States, since under the schedule of the "star wars" program the time has not yet come for full-scale testing of outer space-based ABM systems and components. Second, the U.S. Administration may switch over at any time to a "broad interpretation" as soon as those who work on the program need it.

Hence, the remaining serious concern among the U.S. allies, they believe the U.S. Administration's policy remains uncertain. But, an erosion of the ABM Treaty will have catastrophic consequences for the treaty itself and for the whole process of limitation and reduction of arms.

TASS Report

LD251226 Moscow TASS in English 1020 GMT 25 Oct 85

[Text] Washington, October 25 TASS -- The Washington administration is persistently trying to impose its "star wars" program with the help of intricate demagogic and at the same time is undermining the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty which is an obstacle to its militaristic designs.

Speaking at a conference of the public organization Ethics and Public Policy Centre, the U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, one of the main advocates of the militarization of outer space, asserted contrary to the authoritative opinion of experts and specialists, that the "Strategic Defense Initiative" which provided for the deployment in outer space of a new generation of first-strike weapons was just a kind of a "defense effort". The absurdity of these allegation is clear against the background of the U.S. military doctrine which is aimed at getting an upper hand in a military conflict.

Space strike weapons whose deployment is envisaged by the "Strategic Defense Initiative" are to create a shield from behind which the U.S. could try to deliver the first nuclear strike without any fear of retaliation.

Statements of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle show that the U.S. is furthering exactly these aims. Speaking at Georgetown University, he reiterated the unwillingness of Washington to follow the example of the Soviet Union and pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons which would exclude a possibility of an outbreak of a nuclear war. Contrary to any logic, he asserted that the pledge on the part of the U.S. not to be the first to use nuclear weapons would lead to no other than the aggravation of tension and, possibly, to a war threat.

Paul Nitze, consultant of the President and state secretary on strategic arms limitation, went on with the attacks of Washington on the Soviet-American ABM Treaty which is one of the pillars of the arms control. Addressing a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, he supported the "broad interpretation" of that document with the help of which certain U.S. circles are trying to wreck the treaty and pave the way to the militarization of outer space.

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CSO: 5200/1089

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

DETAILS OF SDI PROGRAM EXPLAINED, ANALYZED

PM310915 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Oct 85 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by L. Semeyko: "Gamble on Aggression; What Stands Behind the U.S. 'Star Wars' Program]

[Text] It is hard to say who was the first to say "a": Who dubbed the main idea which President Reagan included in his 23 March speech the "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI); or who then gave it a sinisterly graphic alternative name -- the "star wars" program -- and who, finally, was the first to enter into a discussion of the mythical "pros" and the catastrophic cons of the militarization of space. But the debates "for" and "against" are not abating. In the heat of these debates the essence of the problem is often forgotten, yet it is not only important, it also has many aspects. What is the specific military-technical context of SDI? What is its real military-political function? Is it a case of defense against the other side's nuclear strike or, on the contrary, of striking against that other side?

We shall look the truth in the eyes: Many people in the West believe in the expediency of SDI. Ideas formed over centuries and millenia are having their effect: Defense is a good thing, a shield over your head means a chance of surviving. And Reagan is continuing to insist it is indeed a question of defense. Present-day psychological perception is also having its effect: Man has grown tired of living under the sword of Damocles of nuclear annihilation. Reagan proclaims this sword will become "powerless and obsolete" if SDI becomes a material reality. This, he says, opens up "new hope for our children in the 21st century." In reality, matters are more complex. Moreover, everything is the other way around here.

The military-technical aspect of SDI -- which is close to fantasy and which, incidentally, is also attractive to many people -- is in principle not that complex. Its essence consists of creating a multistratum ABM defense with space-based elements. To understand this more fully, let's imagine one of the scenarios which is now being publicized by supporters of SDI in the United States.

Missiles (Soviet missiles, of course) are flying toward the United States. The first stage of their "destruction" by ABM weapons ensues: Some 2-5 minutes after their launch directed energy weapons (chemical and X-ray lasers and particle accelerators) "go to work." Accurately directed laser beams can, in one case, burn through the walls of the target putting it out of action. In another case, (X-ray lasers) evaporate the outer layer of the surface after which metal fumes strike the solid casing and initiate a shock wave which destroys it. The missiles are "destroyed" by focused laser beams and elementary particle beams (figuratively speaking by "blasts of sand" travelling at almost the speed of light and therefore, capable of rapidly destroying an obstacle) while they are still above Soviet territory at an altitude of up to 500 km. The United States believes this would be the most effective ABM stratum, because within its framework, it is possible to strike the missiles' fuel tanks, whose walls are particularly vulnerable, before they have fallen away or when they have not completely fallen away. Many missiles, including MIRV missiles, should be put out of action as a result. In other words, one beam pulse can destroy one ICBM at once with several warheads.

The space strike scenario develops further. Surviving missiles reach the intermediate section of their trajectory where they are countered by the second ABM space echelon (stratum). Here the missile's nose cones begin to gradually divide into separate warheads. But warhead "fighters" -- electromagnetic guns and small-scale homing missiles -- are targeted on them. In specialists' opinion, electromagnetic guns deployed in space can give charges speeds of up to several tens of kilometers a second. Antimissiles are launched from satellites (there can be hundreds of them and several small interceptor missiles on each). The strike principle is now different: one charge for one warhead.

Finally, there is the final section of the trajectory and accordingly, the last ABM stratum (echelon) at an altitude of 100-800 km to 9-15 km. Here ground-launched long-range and close-range antimissiles come into play. Their task is to "finish off" the enemy warheads which have gotten through space.

That is an extremely generalized and, understandably, simplified version of the multistratum ABM system which the United States intends to deploy in the remote future. As we can see, its technical basis consists of the use of sophisticated achievements from the scientific-technical revolution. But what about its military-political basis?

Let us note immediately that it is impossible to separate technology from politics here because the technical potential of the ABM system now under review is directly linked with the highly risky military-political goals of its creation by the United States. This potential -- the percentage of warheads which the system will be able to destroy -- is by no means absolute. It may boldly be asserted that no one in the United States right now, even the most zealous supporters of SDI, regards the 100 percent reliability of ABM cover for the country's territory as possible, even in the very remote future. A proportion of nuclear warheads will inevitably break through the ABM shield. This is a general conclusion confirmed, incidentally, by a recent and most respectable study (of 324 pages), a study undertaken by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. That opinions vary as to the magnitude of the percentage which will get through is another matter. But this magnitude is not of decisive significance. After all, it is a case of nuclear weapons -- the most destructive weapons -- with all the pernicious consequences of incinerating explosions inside U.S. territory.

But if that is the case, can the ABM system which is being conceived in the United States be geared exclusively toward defense?

That is dubious at the very least. Considering the gamble on force which has historically taken shape in the United States and considering the strong-arm suppression of everything different, especially in the sociopolitical respect, it may be asserted unequivocally that the orientation of the U.S. ABM system can only be offensive and aggressive -- aimed at disarming the Soviet Union with the aid of its missile and ABM forces and weapons.

U.S. Defense Secretary C. Weinberger is trying to give the appearance of an optimist and is rebuking those who "do not believe" in the possibility of space-based ABM. He cites the example of the astronauts' moon landing. After all, he says, many people did not believe that was possible. It will be the same with the ABM system, he says. To this somebody commented, not without sarcasm: "Yes, the landing did take place. But the whole point is the moon didn't resist." Everything will be different with the Russians, SDI's opponents say. Taking into account their countermeasures, 20 percent of the Soviet warheads could get through today, while tomorrow 30 percent could get through and the day after tomorrow 60 percent. If that is so, what point is there in throwing trillions of dollars into the wind on space weapons? A logical way of putting the question.

But, will these trillions be thrown to the wind as the U.S. military-political leadership understands it? The point is that it sees in SDI a very pragmatic value for itself (and moreover, for the entire world which opposes us). It proceeds from an extremely simple premise: If a considerable proportion of Soviet retribution forces were successfully destroyed in advance by a surprise strike, then the actual number of the (hypothetical) 20, 30, or even 60 percent of warheads to get through the space shield would not be very great. Consequently, the horrors of nuclear war would be "entirely tolerable" for the United States. After all, there is a very curious term -- "acceptable loss" -- in existence in the United States. No one knows how big it is and it is entirely possible that it changes from one administration to the next. But a few million victims are considered perfectly permissible for taking a nuclear risk sometime.

The above position is actually so obvious that Reagan was not able to sidestep it in his "historic" speech: "I clearly realize that defense systems have their limits and raise a number of problems and points needing clarification. If they are combined with offensive systems they can be seen as evidence of an aggressive policy." Well-chosen words, it would seem. It would seem so much simpler today to reject the idea of developing [razrabotka] and deploying large-scale antimissile "defensive" systems if they are linked with "problems and points needing clarification" and embark, at the same time, on a radical reduction -- 50 percent, as the USSR is proposing -- of nuclear means capable of reaching each other's territories.

But the U.S. Administration preferred to be accused of pursuing an aggressive policy. It is maintaining its course of building up its strategic offensive potential in order to acquire the capability to ensure if not the complete, the almost complete, disarmament of the USSR. And, in order for "almost complete" to become "complete," it is necessary for the United States to finally acquire the capability to inflict a first disarming [razorushayushchiy] strike and for the USSR to lose the capability for a second (retaliatory) strike, and the implementation of the SDI is being expedited. [sentence as published] To that end, an attempt is being made to prove the juridical "legality" not only of research work, but also of ABM system tests based on new physical principles. But the letter and the spirit of Article V of the ABM Treaty and the coordinated system "D" on the treaty (and it is to this point that some people in the U.S. Administration are now referring) provide no basis for a unilateral "rethink" of an accord that has, incidentally, existed for more than 13 years already. It is a question of attempts to torpedo the ABM Treaty and implement the "star wars" idea on its ruins. "The Russians assessed SDI as an attempt to disarm the Soviet Union... Thoughtful U.S. specialists recognize that the Russians are right on this," NEWSWEEK wrote at the end of September.

But SDI is also an attempt to mislead the world public with claims that the implementation of SDI will finally rid the world of nuclear weapons. The facts and logic do not confirm the correctness of that. First, the nuclear rearmament program being implemented along with the SDI program in the United States itself runs counter to the thesis. Incidentally, the Excalibur system -- an x-ray laser with a nuclear charge [nakachka] -- is already being tested today within the framework of this program (and the SDI program too). This is a kind of "space nuclear hedgehog" with dozens of laser spines that home in on missiles and warheads (inside the device is a small nuclear charge whose detonation generates a pulsed emission of powerful x-ray radiation). Consequently, with its "star wars" concept the United States is to all intents and purposes perpetuating nuclear weapons rather than ridding mankind of them. According to the real U.S. plans, nuclear weapons are intended not only to "coexist" with a space-based ABM system, but to be launched into space to eliminate nuclear charges.

Second, with the deployment of the first models of space strike arms a double race is starting -- in defensive and offensive arms. Action inevitably generates reaction, including in the creation [sozdaniye] of new (or improved) systems of offensive nuclear arms capable of overcoming an ABM shield.

Third, the principle itself is important: The idea of ridding mankind of nuclear weapons must not be implemented through an arms race unless we want this salvation to come via a nuclear war. But, SDI can only increase the risk of a nuclear catastrophe. The militarization of space will undermine current strategic stability, even if that stability is linked with the deterrent principle of nuclear weapons -- the threat of inevitable nuclear retribution.

SDI is a gamble not on defense, but on aggression. It is not an attempt to ensure reciprocal "nonnuclear" security, but a desire to ensure unilateral U.S. security through the superior "space shield plus nuclear sword" combination. SDI is a path not to disarmament, but to an unprecedented arms race and, ultimately, not to peace, but to war. That is why SDI is by no means an application of human thought to the realities of the nuclear age; an application which must be found and whose foundations are being proposed by the Soviet Union. The achievements of the scientific and technical revolution must not be used either in "defensive" or in "offensive" initiatives if there is a real desire to achieve a turn for the better in the world situation and to continue the life of the human race.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SOVIET COMMENTATOR SEES 'NOTHING DEFENSIVE' ABOUT SDI

LD232319 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1745 GMT 23 Oct 85

[Boris Adrianov Commentary]

[Text] U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger spoke at a conference of the Ethics and Public Policy Center. He again attempted to justify White House's so-called Strategic Defense Initiative. In a demagogic outburst, the Pentagon chief went as far as to state that the program to create a completely new system of antimissile defense with space-based elements inherits the best features of democratic ideals. I asked my colleague, the Commentator Boris Andrianov to give his opinion on this subject:

I will first point out that Weinberger modestly remained quiet about what democratic ideals he had in mind. And judging by it all, he kept quiet with very good reason. In fact, what are ideals if their best features -- to quote the Pentagon chief -- are embodied in the "star wars" program, for this is exactly how the world public has christened the White House's Strategic Defense Initiative.

They christened it with full justification, since this initiative envisages deploying strike weapons systems in space aimed at targets not only in earth orbit, but also on the ground. All the same, the White House has convinced itself that they have been misunderstood, that they have goodwill toward all mankind, and this is the reason why they put forward their initiative, which is highly moral and meets the interests of the United States and their allies and even the cause of peace. But certain forces, it seems, have distorted the essence of the Strategic Defense Initiative by labelling it the "star wars" program. How is this possible, the White House laments, asserting that its initiative should be called a strategic defense shield or a strategic space shield.

However, Washington is resorting to mediocre verbal balancing acts in vain. They are incapable even in the slightest way of changing the essence of the Strategic Defense Initiative. There is nothing defensive about it, because an intentionally offensive system is being created with the aim of attaining U.S. military supremacy.

To confirm this conclusion, the Indian paper PATRIOT carried a statement by a Pentagon spokesman who supported the U.S. plan to militarize space. Among other things, he frankly admitted that the U.S. military might in space is just a natural progression of the U.S. Air Force in a new dimension. This official stressed that it is absolutely necessary for our military potential on the ground, at sea, in the air, and beyond the earth's orbit. But, why does the United States consider all this necessary? Washington affirms that such military potential is necessary, it

says, for defense -- to make itself safe in the event of war. But here is a statement published fairly recently by the U.S. paper, THE WASHINGTON POST. It quoted a statement by one of the Pentagon generals who said straight out that if there is a nuclear war, then it will be started by the United States.

It would be difficult for Weinberger who heads the Pentagon not to know about these very frank statements by his minions. Naturally, he is well aware of them. And it must be supposed that when the head of the military department proclaimed the democratic ideals embodied in the "star wars" program, he had in mind the militarist ideals which belligerent circles in the United Staes are openly striving toward.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW ATTACKS FRG'S SUPPORT FOR SDI

TASS Comment

LD261720 Moscow TASS in English 1502 GMT 26 Oct 85

[Text] Moscow, October 26 TASS -- TASS Commentator Petr Parkhitko writes:

Addressing Bundeswehr servicemen in Bonn recently, FRG Defence Minister Manfred Woerner openly declared in support of Reagan's "star wars" programme and the FRG's participation in the American plans to militarize outer space. The minister laid special emphasis in his speech on what he described as the "need to strengthen the FRG's defence capacity" by means of its participation in the SDI. In that connection he repeated the American proposition that the "Strategic Defence Initiative" is a legitimate step from the viewpoint of international law and "the sole possibility to create a new strategic balance in Europe".

The speech by the FRG defence minister in support of the American plans to militarize outer space is evidence not only of the militaristic ambitions of the Bonn minister advocating a new spiral in the nuclear weapons race. Woerner and other hawks from the banks of the Rhine, who ever more often make public statements in support of SDI, pursue the definite aim of forcing on broad sectors of West German public the idea that the FRG's participation in the "Strategic Defence Initiative" is not only necessary but is actually unavoidable. It is not fortuitous that Woerner pictured it as almost a solved matter during his latest speech in Bonn. It is understandable why the SDI supporters have assumed the "psychological pressure" tactics. As an overwhelming majority of the Western Germans are against their country's participation in the "star wars" plans. [sentence as received]

Woerner and supporters of nuclear armament are doing what is demanded from them by the Pentagon, which views the FRG and its militaristic circles as the main "lobby" in support of the Strategic Defence Initiative in Western Europe. It is precisely the FRG, which according to the U.S. plan, is to permanently pressure the NATO West European allies, who either do not agree to participate in the SDI or vacillate.

Such are the real causes of the sharp growth of activeness of the Bonn "hawks", who have launched a real campaign to advertise the "star wars" plans in Western Europe.

Propaganda Campaign Launched

DW300957 Moscow International Service in German 1600 GMT 29 Oct 85

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Military-industrial circles in the FRG have launched a propaganda campaign aimed at justifying Bonn's official support for the U.S. "star wars" plan.

In his recent speech before Bundeswehr members, FRG Defense Minister Manfred Woerner openly advocated support for the FRG's participation in U.S. plans to militarize space. Special attention was given by the minister to the need to strengthen FRG defenses through participation in the SDI venture. In this connection he reiterated the U.S. version that the Strategic Defense Initiative was a legitimate step in line with international law and he said that it constituted the sole opportunity to create a new strategic balance in Europe.

The fact that the chief of the military authority advocated support for U.S. plans to militarize space testifies to the Bonn minister's military ambitions. He is pleading for a new round in the nuclear arms race. Woerner and his ilk in the FRG have been advocating the SDI venture more frequently in public speeches. In so doing, they are pursuing a very particular goal to suggest to the broad strata of the FRG public that the FRG's participation in the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative is not only necessary, but virtually unavoidable. It was not by coincidence that Minister Woerner in his latest speech in Bonn presented the FRG's participation in the SDI project as an almost foregone conclusion. It is also obvious that SDI supporters resorted to precisely such a psychological pressure tactic because the overwhelming majority of FRG citizens are against their country's participation in the "star wars" plans.

Woerner and the supporters of nuclear counterarmament are fulfilling the will of the Pentagon, which regards the FRG and its militaristic circles as the main thrust of the Strategic Defense Initiative in Western Europe. It is precisely the FRG that, according to the U.S. plan, is to exert constant pressure on those NATO allies who either refuse to participate in the SDI project or who are still undecided. This, esteemed listeners, is the true reason for the greatly increased activities of the Bonn hawks, who have launched a propaganda campaign in Western Europe for the "star wars" plans.

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CSO: 5200/1089

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR EXAMINES JAPANESE ROLE IN 'STAR WARS'

'Catastrophe' Awaits Japan

PM230907 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Oct 85 p 9

[Vladimir Sapronov article under the rubric "We Report the Details": "Fast Train to Nowhere"]

[Text] "The 'Strategic Defense Initiative' is a train which is already in motion, and you Japanese have been delayed on the platform; it will soon be too late" -- that is roughly how the American generals headed by J. Abrahamson, leader of the "star wars" program, worked on a delegation of Japanese experts who were sent to the United States specially for the purpose of familiarization with this militarist venture.

And by all appearances the persuasion worked. The Japanese managed to "jump onto the footplate," promising to make their own missile guidance system available to the Pentagon by the end of the year.

Commenting on these talks, the newspaper YOMIURI writes that now it is only a matter of waiting for a "political decision" by the Nakasone government.

While people in Tokyo talk about a "cautious position" and "study," in the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory in the western United States laser weapons are being developed [razrabatyvayut], not without the assistance of specialists from Osaka University. There too they are creating [sozdayut] beam weapons based on magnetic units from the Japanese firm Hitachi Magnetics.

Joint work on similar types of weapons has been launched at the well known Livermore laboratory too.

In May R. Takeuchi, chief of the Japanese Science and Technology Agency, and J. Beggs, director of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, signed an agreement on participation by the Land of the Rising Sun in the construction of an American orbital station. Japan will invest 300 billion yen in the project -- one-fifth of the total cost. The newspaper MAINICHI has reported that the whole project is being implemented under the Pentagon's leadership. And therefore, for the Pentagon.

But all this is not enough for the American military department. It also needs Japanese-developed optical fibers, systems of communication with "spy" satellites and "killer" satellites, and achievements of microelectronics. Advance orders have been placed for fifth-generation computers which have not even been developed yet. In this situation, is there any need for Tokyo to say an official "yes" to participation in the "star wars" program? Hardly. That "yes" is fraught with serious political complications for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and could, who knows, upset the cooperation which has begun.

The American creators of "star wars" already know they will get everything. Back in June the Japanese Foreign Ministry made it clear that it will not hinder participation by private firms in the American "initiative."

It goes without saying that the firms will be well paid. But what will Japan itself get out of jumping on the footplate of the Pentagon train? Its rulers hope to travel on it as far as the station called "great military power."

Official Tokyo forgets that for the "star wars" express, there could be a different terminus -- catastrophe...

'Dangerous Step'

LD261403 Moscow TASS in English 1149 GMT 25 Oct 85

["Dangerous Step"--TASS headline]

[Text] New York October 25 TASS -- It connection with the conference of six leading capitalist countries, it has become known in the U.S. circles that the Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone has come up with a proposal on behalf of the Government of Japan concerning the participation in the U.S. 'star wars' program. It is pointed out in this connection that agreement has been reached on the government level between the U.S. and Japan on the transfer to the U.S. of a number of military-applied technologies which the U.S. is going to use for creating systems of the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative."

It is stressed in the U.S. circles in this connection that a number of American companies is holding talks with the biggest military-industrial companies of Japan with the consent of the Nakasone government for the purpose of taking the final decision on their participation jointly with Americans in the research within the framework of the "star wars" program.

Journalists Condemn SDI

LD231644 Moscow TASS in English 1218 GMT 23 Oct 85

[Text] Tokyo, October 23 TASS -- A round-table meeting of Soviet and Japanese journalists came to a close here today. Its participants examined during two days of discussions a broad range of issues related to the international situation, disarmament problems and Japanese-Soviet relations.

Members of the Japanese delegation expressed profound concern over the plans to militarize outer space that are being nurtured by the American Administration. They pointed out that this process, unless it is halted, will inevitably result in another spiral of the arms race. They stressed the great importance of the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva, stating that Japan pins great hopes on the summit.

The round-table meeting's participants stressed the need for broadening Soviet-Japanese dialogue, consolidating and developing all-round relations between the two countries.

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CSO: 5200/1089

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: SDI PARTICIPATION NOT BENEFICIAL FOR UK SECURITY

LD270539 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2000 GMT 25 Oct 85

[Konstantin Sorokin commentary]

[Text] THE SUNDAY TIMES recently carried a number of articles indicating that Britain is getting more and more involved in the American "star wars" program. The modernization of an early warning radar station in North Yorkshire is one sign.

When work is completed the radar complex will be able to detect targets in space. It is reported that the Defense Ministry has reached a preliminary agreement with the Pentagon on the participation of British scientists and companies in 18 projects for the "star wars" program. The projects deal primarily with developing powerful lasers and installations for what has been termed the European part of the space defense system.

These reports were not entirely unexpected. It was well-known that the NATO partners are negotiating the official terms for Britain's share in the Strategic Defense Initiative, as it is called, SDI. The information provided by THE SUNDAY TIMES merely enables a better assessment to be made of British-American relations concerning SDI. The deal the American leaders are seeking promises major benefits. In the long run Britain will do what it is being asked to do: supply political and financial support and agree to participate in developing new technologies. A space contract with the Americans, however, would entail major losses for Britain.

It would be naive in the extreme to expect that the project would profit Britain. The White House has repeatedly promised to provide its allies with the newest technology, however the FINANCIAL TIMES has inferred that the United States Congress is more than likely to object once again to Britain being given access to secret research. In this connection it pays to recall that though the Polaris missiles were purchased overseas they are armed with warheads of British manufacture. Is the only reason national prestige? Of course not. The McMahon Act, passed in the United States 30 years or so ago, prohibits the transfer of secret nuclear technology to anyone. By the early seventies, when the Polaris deal was concluded, the McMahon Act had been reviewed on three occasions. However, even then Britain failed to obtain any information about the dispenser system, the main element of a MIRV warhead. And they would fail to do so today. There is no doubt therefore that Britain will be denied access to the United States space secrets.

As for contracts, everything points to the fact that they will be few and far between. When the agreement for purchasing Trident II's from the United States was signed the British manufacturers hoped for a golden rain, 4,000 million pounds. The contracts they managed to get dwindled down to 30 million. It should also be borne in mind that when Margaret Thatcher and Michael Heseltine were negotiating in Washington in August and asked for 1,000 million pounds in exchange for Britain's participation in SDI the United States firmly rejected the proposal.

Now let's have a look at the strategic reasons used by Washington. Many reliable military experts are very critical in their assessment of the capabilities of space armaments. A former chief science adviser of the British Defense Ministry, Mr Munson, published an article in the magazine RUSI in the summer last year devoted to military space systems in which he described these as unreliable, extremely vulnerable to countermeasures and unable to create a leakproof umbrella. This appears especially true if it's recalled that the umbrella is being created not for Europe but for the United States. A British-American space deal would inevitably lead to serious deterioration in the strategic situation and to an unbridled arms race, which for its part would worsen European security.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR ATTACKS U.S. PREPARATIONS FOR REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING

Reagan Meets NATO Secretary

PM091528 Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Oct 85 p 3

[TASS report: "Washington Aiming for Allied 'Solidarity'"]

[Text] Washington, 8 Oct--President Reagan has received NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington in the White House. According to an announcement by the President's spokesman, attention centered mainly on questions concerning preparations for the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva. The spokesman noted in particular that "Reagan stressed his desire to ensure that the meeting is constructive."

It was announced at the same time that the president and Lord Carrington "were unanimous on the need for firm solidarity" within the ranks of the North Atlantic Alliance on the eve of the summit meeting. Observers perceive this statement as a direct indication that Washington and NATO's top leadership are now actively striving to obtain the allies' unconditional support for the U.S. stance on the key issues which will be discussed at the Geneva meeting. The paramount concern is to ensure a "united front" as regards the Pentagon's "star wars" program which, as is well known, causes serious fears among several NATO member countries. In the course of a conversation with reporters following his meeting with Reagan, Lord Carrington himself was forced to admit the absence of the unity which Washington seeks in NATO.

But the White House chief confirmed that the United States has no intention of abandoning its strategic defense initiative. The President claimed that the "star wars" program will not only not lead to the militarization of outer space but will supposedly even "help demilitarize the arsenals on earth." The inconsistency of such claims is noted by most authoritative experts, who believe that the implementation of the plans for the militarization of outer space will cause an unprecedented stepping up of the arms race and its transfer to outer space.

Washington is also aiming at total "solidarity" from the NATO allies as regards the program for the deployment of U.S. medium-range nuclear missile weapons in West Europe. Summing up the results of his conversation with the President, Lord Carrington made it sufficiently clear that the White House is counting

strongly on final agreement to the deployment of cruise missiles with nuclear warheads being forthcoming from the Netherlands Government. The NATO secretary general recalled that the Netherlands Government is due to make its decision on this issue 1 November.

At the same time, the White House meeting did not at all proceed in the spirit of "total solidarity" for which the administration hoped. During the press conference Lord Carrington expressed the dissatisfaction felt by the governments of many alliance member countries in connection with the fact that the United States is actually refusing to consult them on the most important issues of arms control and East-West relations.

PRAVDA Criticizes Poll

PM240934 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Oct 85 Second Edition p. 5

[V. Korionov "Rejoinder": "As the Aims, so the Methods"]

[Text] The more alarm that is aroused in the broad circles of the U.S. people by the ruling elite's course of torpedoing the Soviet-U.S. agreements on questions of arms limitation, the more feverishly the enemies of international cooperation seek ways of discrediting the very idea of mutual understanding with the Soviet Union in the eyes of Americans.

It is this unsavory goal that is pursued by the Committee on the Present Danger statement published recently in Washington.

The complexion of this committee is well-known. It was set up 9 years ago, when the forces that had set their sights on burying detente, abandoning the Soviet-U.S. agreements of the seventies, and opening the floodgates for an unlimited arms race started gaining the upper hand. The big shots from the major military-industrial corporations were the inspiration behind the committee's creation. It was the nest for such inveterate "hawks" as R. Perle, E. Rostow, and the like. The committee's organizers included G. Bush (now U.S. vice president), W. Casey (now CIA director), P. Nitze (now special adviser to the President), and a number of other extreme right-wing politicians. The content of the committee's activity is attested by a laconic statement by C. Vance, who headed the state department under Carter: "There is no doubt that the SALT treaty was torpedoed by the Committee on the Present Danger."

So now this executive committee of the military-industrial complex, as it were, has published a statement on the results of poll it organized on the public "stance vis-a-vis the Geneva summit and arms control." The provocative essence of this venture can be seen both in the fact that the results of the poll that was staged are presented as the opinions of the entire "American People" and in the nature of the questions asked.

Respondents were palmed off with a question about their attitude to a situation in which the "Russians are allowed to have a nuclear arsenal with a greater potential than the U.S. arsenal." Needless to say, most of the respondents, unaware of the existence of approximate equilibrium between the USSR and the United States, answered negatively. The agitators from the committee declared: "The majority of Americans do not expect it will be possible to achieve important results at Geneva." Indeed, the methods are determined by the goals!

Arms Control 'Deliberately Last'

LD241957 Moscow TASS in English 1940 GMT 24 Oct 85

[Excerpts] Moscow, October 24 TASS--As the date of the summit meeting (between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan) is approaching, intensive manoeuvring mounts within the top echelons of the American Administration around the notorious "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI)--the issue which is now in the focus [passage indistinct].

The attempts to adapt the anti-ballistic missile defence (ABM) treaty to the "star wars" programme became a graphic example of such stratagems. In a bid to impart to it "new interpretation", which is absurd from the standpoint of international law, if one is to stick to the text of the treaty, the administration advanced the concept of broad interpretation of the document. As a White House spokesman's remarks show, the "broad interpretation" reduces the matter to absurdity, and creates the impression that the treaty allows and very nearly encourages research and even testing and development of a space-based anti-missile defence. This is how they want to push through the "star wars" programme.

Having encountered strong opposition to the unceremonious assault on the treaty even from its own allies and American experts, the administration was forced to adjust its stance towards "more limited interpretation" of the treaty. What this interpretation stands for is not deciphered. It is also noteworthy that it in no way keeps White House officials from stubbornly asserting that research and testing of corresponding systems will be carried out within the SDI framework.

In continuing to uphold its military space programmes and having no constructive response to the Soviet initiatives, the United States is now seeking to focus public attention on another subject -- so-called "regional issues."

This was announced by a senior administration official at the latest briefing for journalists. According to the official, it is not security problems, that is, not reduction of nuclear armaments and renunciation of the development of strike space weapons, which should be given top priority at the summit talks with the Soviet Union, but the discussion of differences on regional issues.

What this means in actual fact follows from the White House official's answers. Journalists pointed out that the arms control issue was deliberately mentioned last during the enumeration of issues to be discussed at the summit. Journalists asked in this connection whether this does not contradict the general notion that arms control is top on the summit agenda. The answer to this was confusing, its essence being that in Geneva the Americans would like to establish "a stable basis for relations across the board". The U.S. official stressed that the "key" to security should be looked after not in the reduction and limitation of the arms race, but in the establishment of military balance in various parts of the world.

The Washington briefing by the White House official who asked not to divulge his name in the press is rather indicative. What was said there is a stratagem with the help of which the United States would like to divert public attention from the need to resolve the burning problems of our time -- ending the arms race and preventing it in outer space.

U.S. Tries for Propaganda 'Advantage'

LD301126 Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 30 Oct 85

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] According to reports from Washington, top administration officials, including the President, are planning a public relations campaign in what is described as a bid to recapture the advantage taken by the Soviet Union with the proposal to mutually slash in half the nuclear arsenals capable of reaching Soviet and American territories and outlaw for both sides strike space weapons. Here are some details:

Part of this public relations campaign is a series of interviews mostly with foreign media on the Soviet-American summit outlook at a rate of from two to three a week. On the home front the White House is reported to be seriously displeased with reports that the administration is split on arms control issues or even has no coherent arms control policy at all. What's more, the American public appears to nurture too-high expectations. When people are sick and tired of the arms race and eagerly react to even the slightest hint that a major breakthrough in curbing the arms race may be around the corner, it's very difficult to convince them of the need to keep arming. So it's against this background that the White House is planning its counteroffensive, or a campaign to neutralize the Soviets, whose only fault appears to be that they are dead serious about slashing the nukes and banning space weapons.

Let's for a moment at least forget about Soviet propaganda, about all this talk about who's going to win or lose in case of a major arms control agreement. Does this country need an arms race? This is the crucial question. In the past when Moscow proposed to get rid of arms this was attributed to our weakness -- political, economic, and military. Today this argument doesn't work, so it's propaganda. Neither in the past, nor today, not a single person or group of people in the Soviet Union could in any way, materially or politically, benefit from building bombers, missiles, or submarines. We don't have corporate interests or values.

Our one-party system has been a target of criticism by all kinds of people who build careers seeking to prove that it is bad. What these hack writers sought to avoid is that each and every party document throughout our relatively short history emphasized arms control and disarmament as our basic goal. In other words, such documents reflected government policy. This is not propaganda.

In Washington they can do whatever they please to try to blunt or neutralize the Soviet arms control proposals. What they cannot neutralize or distort is this very aspect of Soviet life, and when they neutralize they most certainly do all of us a great service in exposing their own values and morality.

U.S. 'Shifting Emphasis'

PM301822 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Oct 85 First Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Tolkunov dispatch under the rubric "Soviet Initiatives. Before the Geneva Meeting": "United States: State Department Doesn't Know Yet..."]

[Text] New York, 30 Oct -- The local press reports that the activity of the White House and of President Reagan is now increasingly focused on preparing for the upcoming meeting in Geneva. Weekly National Security Council sessions in which the President takes part are discussing specific issues relating to the U.S. position at the summit conference. Briefings held by White House spokesman L. Speakes are devoted to the same topic. In particular, on Monday he stated the administration has largely completed its analysis of the Soviet proposals. The results will be handed to R. Reagan, but the President has not yet decided when he will respond to the proposals.

In the process, Speakes attempted to deny that the administration is shifting the emphasis from arms reduction to regional problems, as the President did recently in his speech at the jubilee UN General Assembly session. Nonetheless, other remarks by high-ranking administration officials indicate there is indeed an attempt to shift the emphasis to regional issues.

It is noted here that this is the essence of Washington's present tactics. For instance, McFarlane, the President's assistant for national security, has spoken out in this vein. General Walters, the U.S. permanent representative in the United Nations, has stated this still more openly; declaring with soldierly bluntness "that it is necessary 'to focus attention' on other issues as well. For instance, Soviet expansionism (!?) in other parts of the world." In fact, the U.S. Administration is making no secret of the fact that from its viewpoint the limitation of the arms race is not the main topic at the upcoming Geneva meeting.

This approach is causing increasing concern among the wide range of Americans who welcome the Soviet proposals, seeing them as a real step along the road to solving the main problem of our time -- eliminating the threat of nuclear catastrophe. Even the conservative NEW YORK DAILY NEWS was forced to recognize the following incontrovertible fact in an editorial the other day: "It is necessary to make an immediate start to the practical reduction of nuclear arms. Necessary, because they are a threat to the survival of our whole planet. For its part, the Soviet Union has been the first to propose reducing them by half provided that the United States abandons the plans for preparing for 'star wars.' That is very important [sерьезно] because the Soviet side is stating that it is prepared to go even further."

Indeed, it is now almost a month since the Soviet Union addressed to the U.S. Administration the proposal on reaching agreement on totally prohibiting space strike arms for both sides and reducing nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory really radically, by 50 percent. The Soviet proposals aimed at the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests (the USSR is continuing unilaterally to fulfill a moratorium in this sphere), a [nuclear] freeze, and other proposals also remain in force. But, there is still no response or welcome from Washington.

On 29 October, 21 days before the Geneva summit, your correspondent sought explanations by phoning Don Lowell, an official State Department spokesman representing the foreign policy department's press service. PRAVDA readers, I said to him, are wondering when a clear answer will be given to the Soviet proposals.

"I can't say at the moment. Maybe during the Geneva meeting," was the answer that came over the phone after a meaningful silence.

I wonder whether the answer might be sooner?

"I don't know. Nothing is clear yet."

Maybe Mr G. Shultz is going to bring something to Moscow?

"I don't know."

There you have it: Comment is superfluous.

U.S. Public Must 'Be Patient'

PM011137 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Nov 85 Morning Edition p 5

[Yu. Bandura "International Notes": "They Are Dodging About in the White House Prior to the Geneva Meeting"]

[Text] It is reported from Washington the White House has announced that throughout the weeks remaining to the Geneva meeting, the U.S. President's attention will be occupied only by preparations for the forthcoming dialogue. On the agenda of this preparation are weekly sessions of the National Security Council, each lasting at least 2 hours; daily morning briefings which will be given to the President by his national security aide, R. McFarlane; and meetings with "experts" on the Soviet Union, congressmen and senators who have visited the USSR, and former U.S. presidents... In brief, the preparation program is so full that R. Reagan will have no time left to study domestic problems.

The fullness of the schedule undoubtedly reflects the White House's intentions to conduct the Geneva talks as effectively as possible. But the question is: What precisely are these intentions? This is not an idle question. People in the United States are asking it with a concern just as profound as everywhere else in the world. The reason lies in a suspicion which is mounting everywhere and which was succinctly, but accurately formulated by THE NEW YORK TIMES observer T. Wicker: By its behavior on the eve of Geneva, the administration is casting doubt on its conscientiousness and purposefulness." This observation is based on facts.

The most important of these facts is the U.S. Administration's approach toward the package of new, broad-scale initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union. Expressing widespread sentiments about this responsible step, the Japanese newspaper MAINICHI writes: "The USSR's present peace offensive has struck against Washington and, from the propagandists' viewpoint, has put it in an obviously unfavorable position. That is why the United States has been faced with the acute need to work out at least some kind of proposals in the disarmament field."

The world waited a long time for Washington to reciprocate, but it never happened. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly jubilee session on 24 October, the U.S. President tried to avoid discussing the current priority issues in Geneva -- the halt of the arms race on earth and its prevention in space. In exchange, he proposed an agenda which would ultimately come down to "discussing the USSR's conduct."

The disillusionment caused throughout the world by this White House "initiative" was only surpassed in strength by the denunciation of Washington's obstructionist positions. The pitch of public criticism ran so high the administration did not believe it could continue -- up to the start of the actual Geneva talks -- to openly reject the demands for a constructive approach toward the Soviet Union's proposals.

There was no need to wait for the results. On 28 October White House Deputy Press Secretary L. Speakes joyfully told journalists: "An analysis of the Soviet proposals in the arms control sphere has been basically (!) completed and the results of the analysis will soon (?) be submitted to the President." Just a day elapsed and an NBC television news program announcer tried to inject a new portion of optimism into his compatriots: "It has become known from sources in the administration," he announced, "that the President will almost certainly (!?) respond to the latest Soviet arms control proposals either before or during the Geneva meeting."

The public is being asked to be patient -- and wait. To wait perhaps indefinitely. After all, it has been stated that the President will answer you. Will almost certainly answer...

But alongside this campaign of "general reassurance" another, perhaps even more vigorous, campaign is under way. Speakes again, having offered the consolation that the discussion of problems connected with disarmament is by no means being taken off the Geneva meeting's agenda, at the same time stated: "Arms control is important. But regional issues are also important." R. McFarlane echoed this thesis almost word for word: "There is no doubt that arms control will be on the agenda... But for arms reduction to be lasting, an atmosphere of responsibility is needed." V. Walters, the U.S. permanent UN representative, played the same variation: "Arms control," he said, "is just one of the fields in which rivalry exists between the great powers." And as it is just one field, then the place assigned to it is not a priority one but merely one of many, the retired general implies to the quick-witted.

The Pentagon is also taking part in the game. C. Weinberger, who recently traveled to Europe, is collecting votes among the United States' NATO partners in favor of Washington's "uncompromising stand" because the Soviets, he says, appear to be violating treaties and not everything seems to be clear with them as far as chemical weapons are concerned...

In brief, the U.S. Administration spokesmen are dodging about. But for all the individual features of their handwriting, they are all doing one thing together whose thrust NBC observer R. Lloyd described as follows: "In the few weeks before the summit the administration is trying to belittle the importance of arms control. Officials note the administration will now place special emphasis on its recent proposals (they have in mind R. Reagan's "initiative" over so-called "regional conflicts" -- Yu. B.) with a view to distracting attention from arms control problems." In other words, to avoid resolving the main problem.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: U.S. CONTINUES TO 'DISTORT' USSR ARMS INITIATIVE

LD180532 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 17 Oct 85

[From the "International Outlook" program; commentary by Vladislav Kozyakov]

[Text] The Soviet Union does its utmost to meet the United States half-way. There are several concrete facts to illustrate this. The new Soviet proposals provide for a 50 percent reduction of the Soviet and American nuclear weapons capable of reaching each other's territory. Let us recall that the previous Soviet proposal to cut strategic arsenals by 25 percent was rejected by Washington because it was allegedly too small. Let us also recall that the present administration refused to ratify the SALT II treaty because it claimed the treaty fixed too high levels of strategic weapons, missiles and bombers, 2,250 from each side.

It looks strange, but today officials in Washington are again dissatisfied with the proposed 50 percent reductions of strategic offensive arms, probably because they are too substantial. Actually, the new Soviet proposals on strategic arms reductions open up new possibilities to come to agreement. The White House claimed that it was interested in a radical reduction of strategic nuclear weapons by both sides. The Soviet proposals if realized will ensure such a radical reduction. The United States will have 1,680 and the Soviet Union 1,250 delivery vehicles capable of reaching each other's territory. The White House also claimed that it was interested in cutting not only missiles and bombers, but also nuclear warheads. The Soviet proposals if realized will ensure a radical reduction of warheads. Both the Soviet Union and the United States will have an equal number of them: 6,000.

Such is the character of the new initiatives advanced by the Soviet Union. Despite this, however, Washington continues to invent various pretexts to distort them. For example, American officials say that the USSR seeks to deprive the United States of the possibility of building new types of strategic weapons while continuing to develop its own new weapons. Such assertions are absolutely groundless. Let us recall in this connection that the Soviet Union repeatedly called on the United States to mutually freeze strategic arsenals and stop modernizing nuclear armaments. But all such proposals were rejected by the present U.S. Administration. Let us also recall that the Soviet Union has stopped all nuclear explosions, which are absolutely necessary to build

new nuclear weapons. The United States, however, continues to conduct nuclear tests in Nevada. This is another example showing what is the policy with regard to nuclear weapons pursued by the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States on the other.

The latest Soviet initiatives are a good chance to stop the arms race. Washington's attitude toward them will very soon show which road the United States chooses: a road to mutually acceptable agreement and stable peace, or a road to ever-growing confrontation and disaster.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET COMMENTATOR BOVIN EXPECTS 'MINOR' PROGRESS IN GENEVA

PM291605 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 24 Oct 85 p 17

[Harald Hamrin dispatch: "Arms Are the Deciding Question"]

[Excerpts] Moscow—"You really can ask yourself the question whether there is any point in going to Geneva," Aleksandr Bovin said, sinking down into his armchair as if weighed down by the irresistible forces of history.

Some 4 weeks prior to the 19-20 November U.S.-Soviet summit in Geneva -- the first in more than 6 years -- an atmosphere of tense expectation rests over Moscow. But it is an atmosphere of expectation which does not contain many elements of optimism. Perhaps it is a question of realism, perhaps of diplomatic tactics.

At any rate, no one says openly that they believe in a real breakthrough in relations between the U.S. and Soviet superpowers, which have been deep frozen since the mid-seventies.

Aleksandr is a typical exponent of this -- as he himself calls it -- realism. As a political commentator on the government newspaper IZVESTIYA -- and a man who in conversation and in print hardly indulges in the otherwise so common Soviet verbosity -- he is widely read and appreciated. His influence is said to stretch far into the innermost circles of power.

He received DANGENS NYHETER's correspondent in the newspaper building on Pushkin Square in central Moscow, a 10-minute walk from the Kremlin. And he answered the question quoted above as to whether there is any point in holding the upcoming summit.

"Despite everything, it is better to meet than not to meet; it is better to talk than not to talk," he said. "In this sense it is better to go to Geneva than not to go."

He said that if there is no major breakthrough in Geneva "we will at least have the feeling of having tried." The Soviet Union has put forward a series of concrete and realistic proposals in the field of disarmament -- and he stressed that these are not some sort of "ultimatum" -- and what is important now is to see what the United States has to offer.

"But, no matter what, we intend to make 100-percent use of our 50 percent," he said.

He left doors slightly ajar -- doors which could lead into the negotiating chambers where, despite everything, compromises are cobbled together even in a seemingly hopeless situation. He stressed that there are two words he never wants to use in his analysis of the political game. The two words are "everything" and "nothing."

"The words are too absolute," he said. "In politics there is very little that is absolute. Who knows what could happen?"

Nevertheless, the ground tone in his analysis of the situation 4 weeks before the summit is gloomy.

"There is talk of minor U.S.-Soviet agreements," he said. "Of the reestablishment of air communications between the two countries, of the opening of new consulates and a direct line between Defense ministers Sokolov and Weinberger. All these things are good. But none of them is decisive for relations. What is decisive is the arms race. That is where the question of war and peace lies."

Here expectations in Moscow have not been raised particularly high -- even though there are hints of the possibility of certain compromises on the major stumbling block, "star wars."

So, what can one expect from the 2 days of talks between the United States' Ronald Reagan and the Soviet Union's Michail Gorbachev at the end of November?

Aleksandr Bovin has already pointed to a few concrete agreements which will very probably be ready for signature in Geneva. Other sources in Moscow complete the picture.

In a conversation with DAGENS NYHETER's correspondent in Washington earlier this year -- long before the agreement on the fall Geneva summit, it is true -- the message from the White House and the U.S. State Department was approximately as follows: "The issue of the arms race and arms control is important to our mutual relations, but it is simply one among several issues; if we cannot reach agreement with the Russians here, it could be possible for us to reach agreement on other questions such as cultural exchanges and air links."

In Moscow the message is the opposite: "The arms race is the most central issue in our relations with the United States. Everything else is peripheral."

Aleksandr Bovin cited from memory his party boss, Mikhail Gorbachev, who said on one occasion: "If we cannot solve this, then there is nothing else that can be solved either."

Other comments gathered during a week of conversations which DAGENS NYHETER's correspondent held with representatives of the Soviet authorities, mass media, and research institutes, all point in the same direction.

Genrikh Trofimenko, professor and head of the foreign policy department of the United States and Canada Institute, said straight out that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union "are not good" and that "that no major improvement has taken place" since the then party leader, Yuriy Andropov, drew what was only a thinly disguised parallel between Ronald Reagan and Adolf Hitler in a memorable PRAVDA interview 2 years ago. "Perhaps there are some expectations in the buildup to the Geneva meeting," he said. "These lighten the picture a little. But the expectations can only be kept alive up to Geneva. If they are not met then, the situation will simply become worse."

First Deputy Director General Gennadiy Shishkin of the official TASS news agency said that "the threat of war is becoming increasingly serious" and pointed to U.S. arms policy. If President Reagan adheres to his line on the issue of the new SDI space defense system, he will "tear up the whole process for talks on arms limitations," he said. "This could have consequences that are impossible to predict," he asserted.

Spartak Beglov, foreign affairs commentator with the APN news agency, said the same in different words. "Washington has not only misinterpreted the signals coming from Moscow recently," he said. "It has also challenged us in a provocative way."

And a representative of the Soviet Foreign Ministry said that the question which overshadows all others is that of "security between East and West and between West and East." "Here practically no progress has been made in the last year," he said. "On the contrary, we can point to a number of negative factors; new U.S. missiles in Western Europe, new strategic nuclear arms, new submarines, new cruise missiles, and new bomber aircraft. On top of all this comes something that is new in principle: the SDI space defenses. This opens all the floodgates and tears down all the existing barriers."

It is mostly words of warning like these that are being spoken in Moscow in a week in the fall when the preparations for the summit are moving up into top gear.

Realism, or a game of diplomatic tactics? We will not be given the answer to this question until Geneva on the evening of 20 November.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1105

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: 27 OCTOBER 'INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS ROUNDTABLE'

LD272001 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 27 Oct 85

["International Observers Roundtable" program, presented by Igor Pavlovich Chariskov, All-Union Radio foreign policy commentator; with Aleksey Nikolayevich Grigoryev, TASS political observer; and Mikhail Vitaliyevich Ozerov, member of the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA editorial board]

[Excerpt]

Warsaw Pact Meeting

[Grigoryev] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to Bulgaria was preceded by an important event which took place in the Bulgarian capital of Sofia where there was a conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. From the material published in our press, you know, comrades, that that conference was held in an atmosphere of friendship and comradely cooperation, and it examined in detail the situation in Europe and the world as a whole, the key problems in international relations. As is clear from the statement by the participants in the conference, attention was devoted chiefly to the vital tasks of struggling to eliminate the nuclear danger, to consolidate peace, to prevent the arms race in space and to end it on earth, to achieve a turn for the better in developments in Europe and throughout the world, and to return relations between states to the stream of detente, cooperation, and peaceful coexistence. And if one tries to highlight the key aspects of that document -- that is, the statement by the participants in the conference -- then one should first say that literally the first few lines of that document state that there is an alarming factor, the increase in international tension. It says that the world has reached a point beyond which events may get out of control. It says that this situation has been furthered by the stationing of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and, particularly recently, the U.S. preparations for star wars and the militarization of space. Again, it was noted in that document that the Warsaw Pact states are not striving for military superiority, which unfortunately cannot be said of the otehr side which is, by its policy, stepping up the arms race, increasing the threats of nuclear war, and pursuing a policy of force and confrontation.

The participants in the Sofia conference assessed highly and supported unanimously the Soviet proposals for a complete ban on strike space weapons and a radical 50 percent reduction in all the nuclear arms of the opposing sides -- the sides in confrontation -- all the nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory. Again the exceptionally important task of freeing Europe of nuclear weapons was stressed, and that creating atomic and nuclear-free zones in Europe was a way to do this. The participants in the conference also issued a reminder of their previous proposals, particularly those that were put forward at a similar conference in Prague when, you will remember, the Warsaw Pact member states suggested that their organization and NATO sign an agreement, a treaty, on the reciprocal nonuse of force, the maintenance of relations of peace, the reduction of military expenditure, and a ban on chemical weapons.

[Charikov] More than 2 years have now passed, Aleksey Nikolayevich, since the Prague declaration was adopted; but as we can see there has been no reply from the West.

[Grigoryev] Yes, unfortunately there has been no reply. Nevertheless, despite the fact that many of the proposals by the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries either go unanswered or an attempt is made to distort or discredit them, the countries of the socialist community continue to come out with new initiatives and will continue to do so. In particular this document that I have been speaking about puts forward a new proposal by the socialist community, a proposal to freeze the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union as they stand at 1 January 1986, including the armed forces outside the borders of both states, and not to increase the military budgets of both states. Again it is up to the United States to reply to that sensible proposal.

[Ozerov] Indeed, primary attention at both the conference of the Political Consultative Committee and during Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to Bulgaria was devoted to the question No. 1: how to halt the slide toward the nuclear abyss. As everyone knows, and as Aleksey Nikolayevich has just mentioned, the situation in the world is extremely dangerous.

The United States is building its arms pyramid higher and higher, including its nuclear arms, and this was stated quite clearly and definitely in Sofia. The socialist countries, coming out there as everywhere in a united peace front, called for measures, immediate measures, to be taken to change the situation. These and other initiatives, including those put forward during the recent visit to Paris by the general secretary of our party's Central Committee, could sharply lessen the threat that hangs over the planet; and it gives rise, of course, to great satisfaction that this is well understood abroad. That was precisely how the Paris QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, the Japanese ASAHI, and many, many other newspapers commented on the proposals made in Sofia. So it would seem that everything is clear: We must go along the path that has been proposed; because, in fact, there is no other path. But we all must go along that path together -- all interested countries taking steps together -- although we, setting an example, have embarked on certain unilateral measures. For example, as everyone knows, a unilateral moratorium was placed on nuclear explosions. However, across the ocean they are so far doing something completely different.

Reagan's UN Speech

[Charikov] As recently as last Thursday, Mikhail Vitaliyevich, the head of the White House delivered a speech at the jubilee session of the UN General Assembly. Figuratively speaking, he was trying to grab the political initiative; he came out with ideas from the rostrum of the United Nations that were generally important, but which, it seems to me, were not of prime, but of secondary importance. I think that it was an attempt, a maneuver, to diminish the effect of the latest initiatives by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries and the response that they evoked, and to detract the attention of the world community away from the solution of those problems to problems of a secondary nature.

[Ozerov] Yes, here I agree with you entirely; furthermore, orators from Washington remind one of conjurers rather than statesmen. They are trying to drag out into the daylight nonexistent facts and figures to conjure with to their own advantage, generally calling black white and vice versa.

In general, all this is being done in the name of the very same, global, but nonetheless, unrealizable idea: to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we have been, and remain, optimistic. In the course of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's talks with Todor Zhivkov, it was noted that even in all the tension of the present international situation, there are possibilities for the achievement of a decisive turn toward the halting of the arms race, above all nuclear, and to preventing its spread to outer space.

[Grigoryev] The question of preventing the militarization of outer space: this is indeed the question of questions. Allow me to remind you, Igor Pavlovich, that you and I met professionally a few years ago in Vienna at an international conference under UN aegis devoted to the peaceful use of space. You remember how anxious were the voices of the participants in that conference -- well-known scientists and cosmonauts who had been in space, and other specialists -- how all of them unanimously talked about the need for space to be peaceful. The Soviet Union has been putting forward one proposal after another; it is going to the summit, which is to take place in a month -- in less than a month -- in Geneva; it is going with the same insistent proposal: to protect space from star wars and to make the whole of space peaceful and to cooperate in space.

Canada's Stance on SDI

[Ozerov] You know, Aleksey Nikolayevich, that reminds me of an episode I witnessed quite recently.

It happened in Canada, in Montreal: at the airport not far from our plane I saw a group of people. They held posters in their upraised hands. The posters read: "Go Home." This is how Montreal citizens met a group of experts from the Pentagon. This group arrived in Canada, attempting to thrust its star wars plan on Ottawa, on the people of Canada. This was, so to speak, Reagan's global intention -- to draw Ottawa into star wars; and the Americans have spared no effort to ensure this. The President personally flew to what he hoped was a future partner. Weinberger, the Pentagon's chief, had deliberated -- even several times on Canadian television -- about the wonderful time which would start when his neighbors received components of a system for space battles. Wonderful time for whom? Not, in any case, for the Canadians, surely. And they have talked and written about this quite extensively.

At the end of August this year, Ottawa officially rejected Washington's proposal. Prime Minister Mulroney's words were clear and definite: Space games are not in accord with our interests; we want genuine peace. How to strive for peace, how to avoid a disaster? This is currently being talked about again and again in the most varied countries from rostrums of the most varied international conferences, including the UN rostrum.

[Charikov] Well, before we come to the topic of the United Nations Organization, Mikhail Vitaliyevich, I would like to continue your train of thought. Scientists, on a wide front, speak against the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative put forward by the American leadership. And I think that scientists are the very people who can imagine better than others how catastrophic will be the consequences of outer space being turned into a testing ground for new types of weapons and a bridgehead for carrying out the first strike. So, scientists, prominent world scientists, gather from time to time at conferences and symposiums and voice their resolute condemnation of these plans.

Such an international symposium, attended by prominent representatives, ended recently in Vienna, where scientists and specialists from various spheres of the sciences met in order to restate that they do not accept, but condemn, the plans for the militarization of outer space.

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET USA INSTITUTE OFFICIALS ON SDI, SALT, INF

LD290229 Moscow in English to North America 0001 GMT 28 Oct 85

[Panel discussion entitled "Top Priority," hosted by Vladimir Posner, with scientists Dr Radomir Bogdanov and Dr Sergey Plekhanov, both of the USA and Canada Studies Institute--live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Posner] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen, this is Vladimir Posner and today in "Top Priority" we will be looking at the recent Soviet proposal in the area of arms limitation, arms control, on the eve of the summit in Geneva. Today we have with us on the panel two distinguished scientists, Dr Radiomir Boganov and Dr Sergey Plekhanov, both of the USA and Canada Studies Institute. Now, let's begin with the major Soviet proposal which is kind of two-pronged. On the one hand we say that there must be an absolute prohibition or a banning of space strike weapons. On the other hand, we offer -- we propose a 50 percent radical cut in nuclear arms that can reach each other's territory. Now, one of the questions that comes up is why do the two have to be connected. Why can't we talk simply about reducing nuclear arms without pulling in as part of the equation the whole business of space strike weapons. Perhaps, Dr Plekhanov, you might care to look at it.

[Plekhanov] Well, I think that to answer it one has to look at the rationale behind the SDI. The SDI is supposed to enable the United States to neutralize a strike by offensive missiles from the Soviet Union.

[Posner] Right.

[Plekhanov] We have to think in scenarios in which the United States would strike first. Now if the United States is continuing, as it is, with modernization of its offensive potential with all the new systems coming into operation and at the same time is trying to develop this kind of a shield which will protect if not the whole territory then the command and control centers and its offensive weapons, the ICBM's in the first place, then this combination looks to us as a very serious threat. Attempts to separate these two issues, no matter what -- no matter how well they -- how well-meaning they may sound, they really don't solve the problem.

[Posner] What about the argument now that the 50 percent cut in nuclear weapons that can reach each other's territory is basically to the advantage of the Soviet Union?

[Bogdanov] You know, it's the usual story. Whenever we lay down something on the table the other side always say oh, it's propaganda, its advantage is only for the Soviet Union. But you know the story is very simple and the case is a very simple one. What the American side is objecting to [is] that we take into account their INF's and strategic delivery vehicles. And they say that we will have to cut our INF's by 50 percent, but they will not cut their own by a single one. It's another, you know, myth. It's another lie. Number one, whatever you may have in mind, you know, INF's for the Soviet Union, since they can reach our territory, not only reach, mind you, but strike our hard targets, our command and control centers, since we know -- and by the way nobody makes a secret out of it -- that they are decapitation weapons, the most dangerous, you know, what you face in the nuclear war. Why we should take them as something very special, kind of sanctuary because they belong to the Americans, on the European territory? For us, it makes no difference since your own life is at stake on the European territory, (?on Spanish) or -- I don't know. They are strategic because they strike our territory and if you come to the beginning of the SALT process, we had come to an agreement with the Americans, what means strategic, what means gray-area weapons, and things like that. What is beyond, beginning from 5,000 kms. And beyond 5,000 kms.

[Posner] (?Kilometer range).

[Bogdanov] Range, range, this is strategic. It is strategic. Now there is no bit of truth that they will have only to cut their own weapons systems on the European territory. We are going to cut our systems, too, and very heavily. If you are not prejudiced, if you are really fair (?now) you will look in number of -- [changes thought] -- first, of all, in Mr Gorbachev's statement in Paris that we are coming down as much as 243 systems, missiles, in...

[Posner interrupts]

[Bogdanov] SS-20'S. In Europe we are cutting down, that we are freezing this level, not only on European territory but on the Asian part, too. That in case, in case there is a very favorable and productive response from the other side, some other possibilities are possible, so what is not fair from our side?

[Posner] Well, what about....

[Bogdanov interrupts] Why, you know, I wish I were in the American position.

[Posner] You do?

[Bogdanov] Yes, I wish I were, from the point of view of security, because I can understand American way of thinking, having Canada on one side and Mexico on the other side.

But they are sitting on our neck, literally speaking, aiming at our head, so it's quite a different understanding of security.

[Posner] OK, OK, but what about the American view that if they take away their INF's then Europe is in danger. They brought them in supposedly to protect Europe. Now if they take them out, what happens to the Europeans? There's that argument, isn't there?

[Plekhanov] But the American missiles are not the only nuclear missiles that NATO has in Europe. There are also British and French and it's a growing and quite substantial nuclear potential which can obliterate all the industrial centers in the Soviet....

[Bogdanov interrupts] Don't forget there are forward-based systems.

[Plekhanov] Oh, yes, on American aircraft carriers, there are nuclear-powered aircraft -- nuclear armed aircraft.

[Bogdanov] F-111, F-111. Then they have their carrier air force, A-6 and A-7, they were there long before, long before INF's were deployed in Europe themselves.

[Posner] Do you think the Soviet Union would be willing to totally do away with its intermediate range missiles if there was agreement reached with the British and the French about their doing away with all of their missiles?

[Plekhanov] Of course, provided that the American missiles are removed as well.

[Posner] Right. Well, now, another question that comes up in connection with the proposal that had been made by the Soviet Union. Let's take a look at the recent meeting of the Political Consultative body of the Warsaw Pact. One of the things that was said there was that the Warsaw Pact countries would be very happy to suggest, or would like to see the United States and the Soviet Union come to the following agreement -- If both countries would take upon themselves not to create conventional military weapons of the same scope and magnitude of power as weapons of mass annihilation, number one; and, number two, to freeze all the military forces of both countries at the level that will be attained by 1 January, 1986, both on their national territories and beyond that. Now, how do you feel about those propositions? Do you think they are realistic?

[Bogdanov] They are very much realist [as heard]. You know, there is a growing feeling, not only among experts but among politicians that the so-called conventional weapons become more and more powerful to that extent that one day we may say, look, where is the difference between nuclear and conventional? So if you get rid of nuclear weapons in Europe, you create nuclear-free corridors, zones, whatever it is, and if you have all that on your neck, the newest conventional weapons with a very high powerful, very high striking power, which can destroy a city like any other nuclear weapon, then, of course, you don't solve the problem, and I think this proposal is a very, very important one because it focuses on the other danger, that we should simultaneously deal with both. There is another problem of the freeze on the level of the arms forces [as heard] on 1 January. I think it's the important proposal and I believe if I were on the American side I would look at that proposal very carefully because we mean not only European territory but we mean the other territories, too, and people in Pentagon will understand what does it mean and I believe it goes, you know, in the right direction. If you are fair enough to think it over then you may come to the conclusion maybe it's very good proposal.

[Posner] I'd like to get back just for a minute to this 50 percent cut which a lot of people are talking about in nuclear arms that reach each other's territory.

There are some Americans who say that the proposal is unfair in that it affects their strategic triad, whereas it does not affect our strategic situation, and although I would say that the average person doesn't really know what all that means, I would like you to take a look at it if possible. Do you think that there's a disbalance involved in this 50 percent, which would seem to be the same, 50 for you and 50 for me, but in reality is there some kind of hidden disbalance in there?

[Bogdanov] Vladimir, when we say 50 percent and when you put this question, what do you mean, do you mean launchers or warheads? A very important question. When we talk about 50 percent cut, what do we mean? And that the whole story -- where the whole story begins. When we say 50 percent we say another thing, that 6,000 warheads for both sides, OK?

[Posner] Six thousand for both? That's the limit?

[Bogdanov] That's the limit, and as to the triad, not more than 60 percent of that 6,000 on each leg of the triad. If you take a pencil and you will calculate then you will see that the fairness, equality, balance, whatever it is, is there, very much there.

[Plekhanov] Let me try to explain that a little bit.

[Posner] Yes, please do that.

[Plekhanov] A longstanding complaint from the American side has been that the Soviet Union has a big force of ICBM's....

[Posner interrupts] Right.

[Plekhanov] Intercontinental ballistic....

[Posner interrupts] Land-based.

[Plekhanov] ...missiles, land-based, that they are supposed to be destabilizing and so on. Now, it's common knowledge that about 70 percent of the Soviet strategic weapons are on those ICBM's. Now, by proposing to cut the total number by half and by stipulating that no more than 60 percent of that number can be based on ICBM's, what we are proposing is cutting very substantially into that part of our strategic (?picture).

[Bogdanov] Exactly, exactly.

[Plekhanov] ...which has caused most trouble, so that's a major step forward. We are trying to meet the concern of the American side about our ICBM's, so I don't really see how one can see it as unfair to the United States. Another important thing is that -- oh, 60 percent figure, (?but) no more than 60 percent....

[Posner interrupts] Sixty percent of those 6,000....

[Plekhanov] Although (?they themselves) can be based on one leg, but we are not saying only 60 percent, so under that ceiling....

[Posner interrupts] It can be 50, 40, 30, whatever.

[Plekhanov] Oh yes, of course, each side is free to mix whatever, so the United States really would not have to mutilate its triad. It would have to cut back its strategic power, maybe that's what makes them unhappy, they don't want to cut.

[Posner] But so would we, so would we.

[Plekhanov] So would we.

[Posner] Right.

[Plekhanov] And we would have to change our structure a little bit, (?if) a little bit.

[Posner] Well, OK, now a final question before we round out this issue of "Top Priority." If you were seeking security, would you accept the Soviet proposal, and I mean now, you know, give it some thought. Do you really think that those proposals would make all of us in the whole world more secure without giving anyone advantages?

[Bogdanov] Vladimir, if I were in your place I would put that question differently. I would put it like that: If you were a Western citizen, would you accept...

[Posner interrupts] Well, that's what I meant.

[Bogdanov] ...Soviet [word indistinct] because in your formulation's it's very difficult for us to say [word indistinct].

[Posner] As you know, I'm playing the role of a...

[Bogdanov] Let me put it that way, if I were Western, if I were American, would I accept Soviet proposal? You know, first of all I would think very thoroughly. Of course, nobody expects at that end that the Americans will look at our proposals in a very benign way or as something given by God, or something like that. No, of course. And I would like to emphasize those are just proposals, it doesn't mean that they must be taken like that, you know, it's just a good piece of meat, if you like, for very thorough and deep discussion. And, of course, as a Soviet citizen, I believe -- that's my very deep and strong belief -- they are good proposals and they make a base, if you like, for a very good, productive compromise. That would be my answer to you.

[Posner] How about you?

[Plekhanov] Well, if I were on the Western side I would test the Soviet Union by discussing these proposals seriously in Geneva at the summit meeting and in Geneva in the ensuing arms talks and try to hammer out an agreement which would be clearly in the interests of both sides, because the substance of this proposal is very good and it's design to serve the interests of both sides.

[Bogdanov] You know, Vladimir, let me (?have) just one word.

They are good not because they are Soviet, because they are meeting American wishes, American requirements halfway and in some fields more than halfway. That's why they are good.

[Posner] Dr Bogdanov, Dr Plekhanov, thank you both for being with us today on "Top Priority."

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CSO: 5200/1105

SALT/START ISSUES

U.S. CLAIMS OF SOVIET ARMS SUPERIORITY CONTESTED

LD010733 Moscow TASS in English 0724 GMT 1 Nov 85

[Text] Moscow, November 1 TASS -- TASS military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

Robert O'Neill, director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, said at a press conference in London, devoted to the release of the institute's annual report, that at present there was rough parity between the Soviet Union and the United States in strategic armaments. Earlier, in February 1985, the conclusion on "rough parity" in nuclear weapons between the USSR and the USA was drawn by the U.S. Joint Chiefs-of-Staff in their report to Congress.

The equilibrium of the strategic nuclear forces of the USSR and the USA was verified in the process of drafting the SALT-2 treaty in 1979. That rough equilibrium has been maintained since that time.

However, in the recent period the balance of strategic forces between the Soviet Union and the United States has become a target of shameless manipulations perpetrated by certain forces in Washington. Senior officials of the U.S. Administration claim that the Soviet Union is superior to the United States in virtually every indicator of military might. These unbelievable conclusions are "backed" by figures which look similarly absurd.

The Pentagon's figures on the strength of Soviet and U.S. strategic bombers are a graphic example of juggling with facts related to the strategic balance. The United States had 576 strategic bombers and the Soviet Union 156 in 1979. That fact was recorded in the supplement to the SALT-2 treaty and signed by the leaders of the two states. At present the number of such bombers on both sides is somewhat lower than it was 6 years ago. The United States is replacing B-52 bombers with new aircraft, and the total strength of the U.S. long-range air force is 509. The Soviet Union has about 150 such planes.

However, the Pentagon's booklet "Soviet Military Power" for 1985 presents on page 34 the U.S. more than triple superiority in bombers as -- an overwhelming superiority of the Soviet Union.

How does the Pentagon do it? First, contrary to official U.S. information that in the past 6 years the United States has taken out of service about 70 B-52 planes, a table in the booklet shows that the United States has at present only 325 strategic bombers which means that it has sidelined 251 strategic bombers over the past 6 years. Second, they have arbitrarily included middle-range Soviet "Backfire" planes in the strategic bombers force, though they are not to be counted in the strategic balance.

Incidentally U.S. experts have recently announced that the United States "reassessed" downwards the range of that Soviet plane -- but the Pentagon falsifiers are unabashed. Third, the number of Soviet strategic planes, without any explanation whatsoever, is arbitrarily hiked by 20 units.

These methods of calculating the strategic balance to dupe the public are used by the Pentagon not only in planes but also in ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the number of nuclear warheads available to the sides. The Pentagon always underrates the strength of its armed forces and inflates the numerical strength of the strategic systems of the Soviet Union. Officials of the U.S. Administration use these falsified figures in their public statements to whip up the campaign about the "Soviet military threat."

Why does the present U.S. Administration indulge in such distortions of the true balance of forces between the Soviet Union and the United States? First and foremost, falsified figures on the balance of strategic forces between the sides are used by the U.S. Administration to justify an unprecedented buildup of the U.S. Armed Forces. Furthermore, in releasing false figures on "Soviet superiority," Washington hopes to distract U.S. public attention from the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union, which, in particular, recently proposed 50 per cent cuts in the nuclear weapons of the two sides reaching each other's territories to 6,000 warheads for each side. Contrary to elementary logic, U.S. representatives are trying to convince the public that these reductions will "perpetuate Soviet superiority."

Meanwhile, parity is a serious guarantee of continued peace and international security. Its maintenance makes it far easier to conduct talks on lowering the level of armed confrontation, on reducing the nuclear armaments of the sides and on lessening the threat of nuclear war.

One gets the impression that Washington is not yet ready to resolve the problem of nuclear armaments through talks on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security of the sides.

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CSO: 5200/1101

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR DEFENSE MINISTRY STATEMENT ON SS-20'S

LD011304 Moscow TASS in English 1300 GMT 1 Nov 85

[**"Statement by the USSR Defence Ministry"--TASS headline]**

[Text] Moscow, November 1 TASS -- In connection with the allegations made in NATO in order to deliberately distort the real state of things, the USSR Defence Ministry had issued the following statement:

The number of SS-20 missiles in the European zone of the USSR is 243, while the number of SS-20 in the whole on the USSR's territory is considerably smaller than the number of 441 of such missiles as given by NATO.

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CSO: 5200/1098

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR'S LOMEYKO COMMENTS ON NETHERLANDS MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

PM311329 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 28 Oct 85 p 3

[Report on interview with Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vladimir Lomeyko by Jan Gerritsen: "You Have to Make the Number of Nuclear Missiles Smaller"]

[Text] Amsterdam, 28 Oct -- A decision in favor of the deployment of 48 cruise missiles in accordance with the government's 1 June decision "disregards elementary logic." In addition, if it does decide in favor of deployment, the Netherlands, would "allow a chance to slip by" of having a positive influence on the 19-20 November Geneva summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev.

So declared Vladimir Lomeyko, spokesman for the Foreign Ministry in Moscow, in an interview with this newspaper. Lomeyko, who is staying in the Netherlands for a few days, takes the view, without saying so in as many words, that the Lubbers cabinet's 1 June decision on the proposed deployment of cruise missiles is in conflict with the 1979 NATO two-track decision.

Lomeyko: "The NATO decision (the deployment of 572 Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe if negotiations with the Soviet Union on limitations on medium-range arms (INF) did not produce any results) was a reaction to the arms in the Soviet Union (SS-20 missiles) which can reach West Europe.

For the deployment decision that has to be taken on 1 November, the Netherlands is using the criterion of the total number of SS-20 missiles deployed on the territory of the Soviet Union, which is, Lomeyko said, "therefore illogical." He pointed out that the number of SS-20's in the "European zone" of the Soviet Union (west of the 80th meridian) has been reduced to 243, and that "that (figure) is a great deal lower than the Dutch asked of us," he said. (According to NATO, in 1984 the Soviet Union had at its disposal 243 SS-20's in the European section of the Soviet Union, that is, west of the Urals. The concept of the "European zone" as used by the Soviet Union also covers some of its Asian territory. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has made it known how many SS-20's are at present operational west of the Urals -- ed.)

The SS-20's east of the 80th meridian "cannot reach Western Europe," Lomeyko states. According to him these weapons are "counterweapons" against the U.S. nuclear systems in South Korea, on Diego Garcia (an island in the Indian ocean) and on U.S. ships in the seas around the Asian mainland. The Soviet Union is prepared to reduce the number of "Asian" SS-20's if the United States also reduces its nuclear potential in that region. As a first step, Moscow proposed a mutual "freeze" on these weapons in Geneva 10 days ago, including the "Asian" SS-20's.

In its 1 November decision the cabinet will take the total number of SS-20's in the Soviet Union, as its point of departure because these three-warhead missiles are mobile. Of this Lomeyko said: "General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has said firmly and clearly that the Soviet Union will not take its European SS-20's to Asia or vice versa. He has also said that the SS-20's which have been placed in the SS-20 installations deployed in the European zone since June, but are no longer needed, will be dismantled within 2 months (from the beginning of October)."

"Both the shipment of SS-20 missiles and the dismantling of the installations can be verified. Everything is verifiable, provided that you take the time to do it. These are all changes in the Soviet Union's official position of which the Netherlands has shown no understanding. The discussion (over deployment) is only being carried on formally; the elementary logic is lacking."

Asked what influence a positive Netherlands deployment decision will have on the Geneva summit, Lomeyko replied: "Different answers to that are possible. They are all a part of life. But the Netherlands would then allow a chance to pass by of making a positive contribution to the discussion."

The Soviet spokesman pointed to a fundamental political aspect. "If we are both interested in surviving, you have to make the number of missiles smaller and not larger. Thus it is illogical to take new steps a few weeks before the summit, which will be dominated by the desire for an agreement to reduce the danger of war through reductions in the nuclear arsenals."

According to Lomeyko the acceptance of new missiles also means support for U.S. forces pursuing a policy of strength. A Netherlands decision in favor of deployment will make these forces more arrogant, and it is perverse logic to argue that fewer missiles would weaken the U.S. position." [no opening quote marks as received]

[Gerritson] The Netherlands is dependent for its security on cooperation within NATO. With deployment the Netherlands is simply carrying out a NATO decision that, for whatever reasons, was thought necessary. You, after all, would want a member of the Warsaw Pact to carry out a decision made by all the countries of the Warsaw Pact.

[Lomeyko] I have already said that the Netherlands cannot rest on the NATO decision. Also, things are completely the other way around. Through a Netherlands decision in favor of deployment, the United States wants to give a signal that West Europe supports the U.S. position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. But the question is: which position? You can check our measures from the starting point that you want an objective situation. But if the withdrawal of the SS-20 missiles does not please you, you can of course resort to all sorts of little tricks.

Of the prospects for the Geneva summit Lomeyko said: "After all the radical proposals for arms reductions from General Secretary Gorbachev, leave it up to the United States to respond. But there are two Americas. Some people want arms control, others do not. They want a position of ascendancy over the Soviet Union. For us the concept of parity is supreme. It is thus a question of political will. After President John Kennedy came to power it was possible to reach an agreement banning aboveground nuclear tests within 3 days. Negotiations with the same aim had been going on for months. From this you can see how important political will is."

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CSO: 5200/1098

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

BRIEFS

VIENNA: RYZHKOV INVITES LUBBERS--The Hague--The Netherlands head of government Lubbers has been invited by Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov to talk on intermediate-range missiles. According to Netherlands newspapers yesterday, 2 days before the decision of the Netherlands Government on the deployment of 48 U.S. cruise missiles, Soviet Ambassador Blatov conveyed a corresponding telegram of the Soviet government to Lubbers. Tomorrow, the Netherlands Government will decide if the decision on counter armament of 1 June 1984 will be implemented. [Text] [Vienna ORF Teletext in German 1422 GMT 31 Oct 85]

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CSO: 5200/1098

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

IZVESTIYA ON POSITIONS AT STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

PM291315 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Oct 85 Morning Edition pp 4-5

[Dispatch especially for IZVESTIYA by N. Vukolov, chief of the TASS department in Sweden: "Stockholm Conference: Resolute Turn Needed"]

[Text] Stockholm -- Naturally, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe cannot be artificially divorced from present-day European and world reality and from the influence of the events taking place beyond the walls of the session hall. This was vividly confirmed during the seventh session of this important political forum that has been taking place in the Swedish capital.

The Soviet-French summit has had a positive influence on the work of the present session of the Stockholm conference. The visit to France by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, laid a good foundation both for the development of Soviet-French cooperation, which is an essential factor for stability in Europe and for a turn toward a radical improvement in international relations and the strengthening of all world states' security.

As for Europe, the movement along the road laid in Helsinki has always depended on the climate prevailing on the continent, on whether the political will and initiative exist to strive for detente and security, and on how bilateral relations among states are organized. Europe, where detente was born, can and must play an indispensable role in the active quest for ways leading to a radical improvement of the situation, which would promote to a considerable extent the successful completion of the Stockholm conference.

As the development of international affairs shows, there is an increasing trend in Europe toward breaking with the logic of confrontation. That requires resolute and bold actions and a new view of and approach to many international problems, particularly the resolution of the tasks of strengthening confidence and security on the European continent. Do the real prerequisites for this exist? Yes, they do. As M.S. Gorbachev stated in Paris, it is time to turn the Stockholm conference more resolutely toward working out accords, since "there are opportunities here for stepping up the search for mutually acceptable solutions."

One manifestation of these opportunities was the decision to shift the conference's work to specific talks on a range of questions which could comprise the outlines of a future agreement. This step outlines the framework and pointers for advancing the work; makes it possible to seek mutually acceptable solutions more flexibly; and puts the conference on a businesslike footing.

It is believed in the forum's journalistic circles that it is a question of working out preliminary accords on large-scale, mutually complementary, confidence-building measures in both the political and military spheres.

The socialist countries have submitted balanced proposals bearing on both the aforesaid spheres for examination at the conference. Their proposal to conclude a treaty on the mutual nonuse of military force and support for relations of peace is firmly part of the fabric of the talks. Many West European countries are clearly and unambiguously advocating that the nonuse of force be the immutable norm for states' behavior in order for the conference to make its own weighty contribution to this matter. In the current explosive situation there is a greater need than ever to make more effective the observance of commitments concerning the nonuse or threat of force and concerning the most important avenue -- banning the use of all types of weapons, both nuclear and conventional, and consequently banning the use of military force altogether.

The suggestions put forward by the socialist countries that notification be provided about major ground forces, air force and naval exercises and troop transfers and also that observers be invited as a sort of safety net to prevent incorrect interpretations of the other side's actions are being actively discussed.

The report of the Soviet Union's readiness to come to an agreement on a reciprocal exchange of annual plans of military activity subject to notification generated a positive response at the last session.

In a talk with this writer, Ambassador P. Gaschignard, head of the French delegation at the conference, expressed the hope, referring to the aforementioned question, that this approach by the Soviet side would give a positive new boost to the Stockholm conference's work.

Thus, as is being noted behind the scenes at the conference, a prospective new sphere of confidence-building measures is opening up -- an exchange of annual plans of military activity subject to notification, and on not a reduced but a broad scale, encompassing all types of exercises and troop movements.

This proposal, like the other confidence-building measures -- be they measures of limitation, notification, or observance -- must accord with the demand to ensure equal security for all states participating in the Stockholm conference. Needless to say, the exchange of annual preliminary plans of military activity must include major exercises both of ground forces and of air and naval forces as well as troop movements (transfers). If we are to really set ourselves the task of removing layers of suspicion, it is necessary to embrace the entire range of exercises on land, at sea, and in the air.

In our day and age the infantry is no longer the unchallenged monarch of the battlefield. The new "gods of war" at sea and in the air, equipped with the most powerful and threatening weapons, shake Europe's security during their exercises. But if one takes into consideration the fact that during these exercises the bulk of ground, naval, and air forces are brought up to full combat readiness and have the necessary ammunition, the activity is actually reminiscent of the prelude to war and, consequently, leads to the growth of suspicion and distrust. That is why all participants in the all-European process must have prior knowledge about precisely such major exercises, their location and the times when they are held. This kind of information must be included in the annual plans.

A lively discussion is under way at the conference about the proposals of the socialist and nonaligned countries on limiting the scale of military exercises.

Their urgency was clearly seen in the examples of recent NATO exercises, which are sometimes on such a scale that it is hard to distinguish them from troop deployments for the start of hostilities.

Against that background the attempt by representatives of a number of NATO states to convince the conference that European security is threatened only by ground forces, while the actions of air forces and navies are something akin to tourist cruises to Europe, looks flimsy. Incidentally, these claims have already been discredited during the work of the conference's seventh session, when major NATO naval maneuvers code-named "Baltops-85" in which the main role was played by the battleship "Iowa" -- one of the largest warships in the U.S. Navy and, according to press reports, carrying 32 Tomahawk cruise missiles with nuclear charges -- were held in the southern Baltic, in direct proximity to the Swedish coast. Together with other ships, the "Iowa" carried out training firing exercises against shore-based targets and the thunderous boom of the shots was carried along the Baltic to the Scandinavian capitals, triggering large protest demonstrations whose participants rightly assessed the NATO naval games with the participation of the "Iowa" as a "sinister piece of military muscle-flexing."

Although the U.S. and certain other NATO countries' representatives are finding it increasingly difficult to produce "counters" to such weighty arguments, they are continuing their line of restricting the framework and potential of the Stockholm conference in an attempt to boil things down to measures that merely concern the activity of ground forces while leaving aside the most dangerous types of arms -- aircraft and fleets. Moreover, instead of strengthening security they are stubbornly pushing for the opposite -- measures aimed at revealing the deployments and structure of the European states' armed forces and at obtaining unilateral advantages.

In describing the results of the seventh session, special envoy D.A. Grinevskiy, leader of the USSR delegation, noted at its concluding session that the decision to switch to specific talks on a range of questions which could comprise the outlines for a future agreement, as well as the work already commenced on that basis, show that opportunities exist at the conference for the positive development and stepping up of the quest for a mutually acceptable solution.

This is what the socialist countries are striving for, demonstrating a constructive approach and good will at the European forum. The development in the near future of substantive mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures in Europe of both a political and a military nature was noted as an important task at the conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee held recently in Sofia.

It can be said that the results of the session's work are creating good prerequisites for developing future accords. The conference, TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA believes, "has taken a step forward." Satisfaction at the progress achieved at the Stockholm conference was expressed in the communique on the results of the meeting of Nordic foreign ministers held at the end of last week in Oslo. The document stressed that positive results at the conference would create favorable prerequisites for the work of the Vienna meeting of representatives of the participating states in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which will open in fall 1986.

This recollection reflects today's fast pace, which dictates the urgent need to rapidly resolve complex and acute international problems, including the confidence and security questions on the Stockholm conference agenda. However complex these questions may be, results can be achieved if the political will exists.

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CSO: 5200/1091

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: MUNICH DECLARES ITSELF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

LD310147 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1745 GMT 30 Oct 85

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Konstantin Patsyuk]

[Text] The Munich city administration has decided to declare the city a zone free from nuclear weapons. In accordance with this decision, the agency DPA notes, on the signs giving the name of the city which are set up at the entrances to Munich, from now on there will also be the legend "Zone Free From Nuclear Weapons." This is an interesting report. I ask Viktor Levin to talk about its significance:

In the FRG, as in many other Western European states, the movement for the designation of cities and regions as zones free from nuclear weapons has received wide support. This movement reflects the increased concern of the population in connection with the deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles and the desire to make its contribution to the struggle against the dangerous militarist course of the United States of America and NATO as a whole. Although the powers that be try to hush up the local government organs which take measures diverging from the official course, the moral significance of zones free from nuclear weapons does not raise any doubts.

The example of Munich in this regard is particularly noteworthy. After all, this city is the capital of Bavaria, where, for already more than 3 decades without interruption, the Christian Social Union [CSU] has been governing. Its leader, Franz Josef Strauss, is considered with complete justification as the most belligerent hawk of the West German state.

Strauss has made not a few efforts also toward transforming Bavaria into a kind of West German California, where some of the most major military-industrial concerns are concentrated. He has also helped realize NATO plans for turning the FRG into a launching pad for U.S. nuclear missiles.

But in his own capital of Munich, Strauss has met with determined opposition to the militarist course. In the city administration, the CSU and the Free Democrats which support it, do not have a majority. There, the tone is set by the Social Democrats. On the question of designating Munich a zone free from nuclear weapons, they were also supported by representatives of the Greens. The land government, presently headed by Strauss, attempted with the aid of juridical tricks to bring the city administration into line, but it proved to be a tough nut to crack and was able to stand firm.

Now, each time Strauss leaves Munich or returns there by car, he will not be able to take his eyes off the text "Zone Free From Nuclear Weapons." It is hard to imagine that, under the influence of these words, he will be able to change his attitude toward military policy, but the reminder of its danger cannot be out of place.

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CSO: 5200/1083

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: RESISTANCE IN JAPAN TO U.S. NUCLEAR SUBMARINE VISIT

OW280915 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1000 GMT 25 Oct 85

[Afonin commentary]

[Excerpts] Concerning U.S. attitudes towards its allies, Radio Moscow Commentator Afonin states the following:

Once again, Japanese public opinion is focussed on the U.S. military authorities' violation of Japan's three nonnuclear principles as demonstrated by a recent call at Yokosuka port by "Houston", a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine. The Foreign Ministry has rejected a request by Yokosuka residents and the city authorities to question the U.S. Government whether or not the "Houston" is equipped with nuclear arms.

Since Tomahawk nuclear missiles are deployed on most of the U.S. submarines of this class and since authoritative intelligence sources have clearly pointed out that "Houston" is equipped with Tomahawks, it is quite natural for city residents and authorities to be concerned about "Houston's" port call. The Foreign Ministry cites its usual reason for rejecting the request: Concerning the bringing of nuclear arms into Japan, the United States is obliged to have prior consultations with the Japanese Government, and since no consultations have been requested, no nuclear arms can be deployed on the "Houston."

Not many people believe such a pretext. In view of the arrogant behavior of the U.S. military authorities in various parts of the world, it will not be difficult to understand that such a pretext does not make any sense at all.

Such behavior by Washington fully conforms to the policy of the U.S. Government that it can impose its own will on other countries without taking the legitimate interests of sovereign nations into consideration. For example, in an attempt to attain military and strategic superiority over the USSR, the United States has gradually turned the [words indistinct] in Western Europe into its own nuclear bases and in an attempt to maintain and expand its military presence in these countries, the United States has resorted to blatant intervention into the internal affairs of other countries.

The U.S. forces' wayward actions are now faced with increasing resistance. Despite Washington's pressure, the New Zealand Government has rejected port calls by American war vessels without verification that they are not equipped with nuclear arms. Moreover, the people of the Netherlands are protesting against the deployment of American nuclear missiles in the Netherlands. And in Japan, peace fighters greet port calls by American warships with anti-U.S. demonstrations.

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CSO: 5200/1083

NUCLEAR-FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET COMMENTARY ON NEW ZEALAND ANTINUCLEAR MEASURES

LD270056 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 25 Oct 85

[Vladimir Beloshapko commentary]

[Text] New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange has stated in an interview with THE WASHINGTON POST that in November of this year the government would introduce a bill in parliament officially banning visits to the country's ports of ships carrying nuclear weapons on board. Mayak Commentary -- Vladimir Beleshapko is at the microphone:

As is known, the antinuclear status of New Zealand, which the Lange government is resolutely defending, has become the cause of serious friction in American-New Zealand relations. This conflict goes beyond the context of bilateral ties between those states, although Washington's crude pressure on New Zealand is in itself a visible confirmation that the United States prefers to talk with the language of force, even with its allies. All the same, I repeat, the matter is far broader: is the South Pacific to be a nuclear-free zone or is the region to be turned into a source of nuclear danger with all the attendant consequences? The United States is leading things in precisely that direction. It has a broad network of military bases there and permanently keeps warships equipped with nuclear weapons. This is being done in spite of the will of the peoples of the region, who do not want to be transformed into nuclear hostages of Washington. It is precisely this circumstance which explains the growing anti-military feelings in the South Pacific. And they are increasingly taking hold not only of the public, but also of state and political circles. An example of this is New Zealand. But it is not the only one. Recently a group of countries of the region announced their decision to proclaim the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone. In this way there is a sort of antinuclear chain reaction in progress. But this is in no way inscribed in the schemes of the American strategists, who see almost the entire world as a potential theater of military operations. To judge from David Lange's statement, New Zealand intends to continue its anti-nuclear course. This is natural. After all, as was stressed in the statement adopted 23 October in Sofia by the Warsaw Pact member-states, the efforts of the states of the South Pacific to create a nuclear-free zone serve the interests of ensuring universal security.

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CSO: 5200/1083

NUCLEAR TESTING

UN 1ST COMMITTEE DELEGATES SUPPORT SOVIET MORATORIUM

LD300300 Moscow TASS in English 2303 GMT 29 Oct 85

[Text] New York October TASS -- TASS correspondent Vyascheslav Chernyshev reports:

The ending and prohibition of nuclear weapon tests constitutes one of the main themes of debates at the First Committee (political and security, including the regulation of armaments) of the U.N. General Assembly.

In the course of the debates most of the delegations spoke for the early ending of the tests, which are an accelerator of the nuclear arms race, and support the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions as a concrete contribution towards the removal of the nuclear threat. At the same time representatives of the international community point out the grave responsibility incurred by the USA and some of its NATO allies by rejecting talks on this problem.

The efforts of the community of nations, the permanent representatives of Laos, Kithong Vongsai said, are hampered by the imperialist forces, which are seeking the quantitative and qualitative escalation of nuclear armaments.

Syrian representative A. al-Atassi called upon the USA and its allies to disabuse themselves of the illusion of the winnability of nuclear war and to stop raising barriers in the way of a treaty on complete and universal prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The delegates of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and other countries pointed out the deep worry caused at the United Nations by Washington's intention to carry through at all costs its large-scale programmes for the buildup and modernisation of nuclear weapons and the development and deployment of space strike weapons with a view to achieving military superiority.

The Soviet Union has always believed that the early prohibition and ending of nuclear weapon tests would meet the interests of mankind as a whole, Soviet delegate V. Petrovskiy said. This measure would help to raise an effective barrier in the way of improvements in those weapons of mass destruction and simultaneously to tighten the non-proliferation regime. Brakes would effectively be applied to the nuclear arms race. The test ban would actually lessen the threat of nuclear war. The USSR, the Soviet delegate stressed, advocates progress in all avenues without exception that are leading to the removal of the nuclear threat, and is prepared to resolve this problem without delay at any forum, naturally, on the basis of reciprocity.

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END